1 00:00:02,040 --> 00:00:04,510 Good morning . I'm Colonel Pete Hayden , 2 00:00:04,610 --> 00:00:06,832 the Staff judge Advocate for the United 3 00:00:06,832 --> 00:00:08,721 States cyber Command On behalf of 4 00:00:08,721 --> 00:00:10,980 General Paul Nakasone and my staff , I 5 00:00:10,980 --> 00:00:14,040 welcome you to the 2022 United States 6 00:00:14,040 --> 00:00:16,920 Cyber Command Legal Conference Since 7 00:00:16,920 --> 00:00:19,087 the first cyber com legal conference . 8 00:00:19,087 --> 00:00:21,580 This forum has grown remarkably From 20 9 00:00:21,580 --> 00:00:23,580 people gathered in a single room in 10 00:00:23,580 --> 00:00:27,040 2011 To over 10,000 global viewers last 11 00:00:27,040 --> 00:00:29,900 year . This year , registrations come 12 00:00:29,900 --> 00:00:32,490 from more than 30 countries , including 13 00:00:32,490 --> 00:00:34,770 government employees , members of the 14 00:00:34,770 --> 00:00:37,140 private sector operators , legal 15 00:00:37,140 --> 00:00:38,862 professionals , commanders and 16 00:00:38,862 --> 00:00:41,380 policymakers . The breadth and depth of 17 00:00:41,380 --> 00:00:42,936 interest in this conference 18 00:00:42,936 --> 00:00:45,158 demonstrates that cyberspace operations 19 00:00:45,158 --> 00:00:47,213 and the legal frameworks that impact 20 00:00:47,213 --> 00:00:49,047 them increasingly significant to 21 00:00:49,047 --> 00:00:50,936 everyone from those who run large 22 00:00:50,936 --> 00:00:52,880 enterprise networks , to those who 23 00:00:52,880 --> 00:00:55,980 depend on just a single device . Today , 24 00:00:56,080 --> 00:00:58,191 you'll hear from senior Department of 25 00:00:58,191 --> 00:01:00,413 Defense leaders , legal practitioners , 26 00:01:00,413 --> 00:01:02,350 academics , journalists and other 27 00:01:02,350 --> 00:01:04,628 leading experts in the cyber community . 28 00:01:04,840 --> 00:01:07,210 We will address the legal policy and 29 00:01:07,220 --> 00:01:09,053 operational issues raised by the 30 00:01:09,053 --> 00:01:12,210 promise and perils of cyberspace . We 31 00:01:12,210 --> 00:01:13,932 hope you find the material and 32 00:01:13,932 --> 00:01:16,154 discussions presented today informative 33 00:01:16,154 --> 00:01:18,154 and valuable in these extraordinary 34 00:01:18,154 --> 00:01:20,980 times . Now I have the great privilege 35 00:01:20,980 --> 00:01:23,202 to introduce you to our first speaker , 36 00:01:23,540 --> 00:01:25,707 a man of unique leadership and skill . 37 00:01:26,040 --> 00:01:28,151 He leads three separate organizations 38 00:01:28,151 --> 00:01:30,373 to include the National Security Agency 39 00:01:30,373 --> 00:01:32,550 and the Central Security Service . But 40 00:01:32,550 --> 00:01:34,920 for our purposes today , I'm honored to 41 00:01:34,920 --> 00:01:37,031 introduce him to you as the Commander 42 00:01:37,031 --> 00:01:39,360 of U . S . Cyber Command responsible 43 00:01:39,360 --> 00:01:41,270 for planning and executing global 44 00:01:41,270 --> 00:01:43,920 cyberspace operations to defend and 45 00:01:43,920 --> 00:01:46,300 advance us natural national interests 46 00:01:46,310 --> 00:01:48,254 in collaboration with domestic and 47 00:01:48,254 --> 00:01:50,421 international partners across the full 48 00:01:50,421 --> 00:01:52,588 spectrum of competition and conflict . 49 00:01:52,740 --> 00:01:54,740 Ladies and gentlemen , General paul 50 00:01:54,740 --> 00:01:55,740 Nakasone . 51 00:01:58,640 --> 00:02:01,620 Good morning And welcome to the 2022 52 00:02:01,630 --> 00:02:03,900 Cyber Command Legal Conference . I'd 53 00:02:03,900 --> 00:02:06,122 like to thank all of you for joining us 54 00:02:06,122 --> 00:02:07,900 today . Whether you're from the 55 00:02:07,900 --> 00:02:09,844 operations and policy worlds , the 56 00:02:09,844 --> 00:02:11,870 intelligence community , academia , 57 00:02:11,870 --> 00:02:14,300 private industry , your insights and 58 00:02:14,310 --> 00:02:16,440 expertise help advance the field of 59 00:02:16,440 --> 00:02:19,310 cybersecurity . I also want to thank 60 00:02:19,310 --> 00:02:21,366 Colonel Pete Hayden and his team for 61 00:02:21,366 --> 00:02:23,254 putting together such a wonderful 62 00:02:23,254 --> 00:02:25,730 lineup in the highly regulated field of 63 00:02:25,730 --> 00:02:28,130 cyberspace operations . A deep 64 00:02:28,130 --> 00:02:30,260 understanding of law and policy is at 65 00:02:30,260 --> 00:02:32,860 the forefront of all we do . I'm 66 00:02:32,860 --> 00:02:35,027 excited to talk to you today about our 67 00:02:35,027 --> 00:02:37,082 mission and some of the unique legal 68 00:02:37,082 --> 00:02:39,138 challenges we face . When I spoke to 69 00:02:39,138 --> 00:02:41,304 you last year , our focus was on solar 70 00:02:41,304 --> 00:02:43,527 winds , election security and strategic 71 00:02:43,527 --> 00:02:45,693 competition . None of these issues has 72 00:02:45,693 --> 00:02:47,860 gone away in the wake of solar winds . 73 00:02:47,860 --> 00:02:49,804 We continue to see malicious cyber 74 00:02:49,804 --> 00:02:51,693 activity , including the colonial 75 00:02:51,693 --> 00:02:54,010 pipeline intrusion . We're stepping up 76 00:02:54,010 --> 00:02:55,899 our efforts to defend the midterm 77 00:02:55,899 --> 00:02:58,121 elections and strategic competition has 78 00:02:58,121 --> 00:03:00,066 taken on a whole new look with the 79 00:03:00,066 --> 00:03:01,899 situation surrounding Russia and 80 00:03:01,899 --> 00:03:05,080 Ukraine today , I'd like to share my 81 00:03:05,080 --> 00:03:07,191 perspective on the evolving strategic 82 00:03:07,191 --> 00:03:09,191 environment . Review . A few of the 83 00:03:09,191 --> 00:03:11,413 cyberspace challenges we faced over the 84 00:03:11,413 --> 00:03:13,469 past year and introduce a few of the 85 00:03:13,469 --> 00:03:15,580 partnership initiatives we're working 86 00:03:15,580 --> 00:03:18,320 on to address these challenges In 2022 , 87 00:03:18,320 --> 00:03:20,487 the strategic environment continues to 88 00:03:20,487 --> 00:03:22,542 Evolve . Nearly every form of nation 89 00:03:22,542 --> 00:03:24,487 state competition and conflict now 90 00:03:24,487 --> 00:03:26,542 includes a cyberspace component , as 91 00:03:26,542 --> 00:03:28,709 evidenced by the emerging situation in 92 00:03:28,709 --> 00:03:31,080 Ukraine concurrent with the build up of 93 00:03:31,080 --> 00:03:33,413 armed forces along the Ukrainian border . 94 00:03:33,413 --> 00:03:35,358 And in wake of Russia's unprovoked 95 00:03:35,358 --> 00:03:37,469 attack , there were reports of Russia 96 00:03:37,469 --> 00:03:39,636 conducting cyber operations to disrupt 97 00:03:39,636 --> 00:03:41,691 the democratically elected Ukrainian 98 00:03:41,691 --> 00:03:43,580 government and to undermine their 99 00:03:43,580 --> 00:03:45,910 ability to govern . They also sought to 100 00:03:45,910 --> 00:03:47,799 shape the operational environment 101 00:03:47,799 --> 00:03:50,021 through information warfare designed to 102 00:03:50,021 --> 00:03:51,966 influence the Ukrainian public and 103 00:03:51,966 --> 00:03:53,688 shape the battlefield to their 104 00:03:53,688 --> 00:03:56,130 advantage . The Russia Ukraine conflict 105 00:03:56,140 --> 00:03:58,029 raises the possibility of Russian 106 00:03:58,029 --> 00:04:00,570 cyberspace operations targeting us and 107 00:04:00,570 --> 00:04:03,060 allied interest . It's hard to imagine 108 00:04:03,060 --> 00:04:04,893 a future conflict that would not 109 00:04:04,893 --> 00:04:07,060 include similar tactics in and through 110 00:04:07,060 --> 00:04:09,150 cyberspace either as an independent 111 00:04:09,150 --> 00:04:11,310 mission or in support of kinetic 112 00:04:11,310 --> 00:04:14,270 activity beyond these immediate 113 00:04:14,270 --> 00:04:16,437 challenges , relentless and enduring . 114 00:04:16,437 --> 00:04:18,492 Strategic competition continues with 115 00:04:18,492 --> 00:04:21,250 our adversaries in cyberspace , china 116 00:04:21,250 --> 00:04:23,250 and Russia use cyberspace to pursue 117 00:04:23,250 --> 00:04:25,480 their own agendas to the detriment of 118 00:04:25,480 --> 00:04:28,100 the rule of law through cyber effects 119 00:04:28,100 --> 00:04:30,044 operations , information warfare , 120 00:04:30,044 --> 00:04:32,270 intellectual property theft and supply 121 00:04:32,270 --> 00:04:33,970 chain interference . They act 122 00:04:33,980 --> 00:04:36,030 indiscriminately and ignore norms 123 00:04:36,300 --> 00:04:38,740 without justification . Their 124 00:04:38,740 --> 00:04:41,210 operations often affect more than their 125 00:04:41,210 --> 00:04:43,043 intended targets and have caused 126 00:04:43,043 --> 00:04:45,099 billions of dollars in damage around 127 00:04:45,099 --> 00:04:48,860 the world . North Korea brazenly uses 128 00:04:48,860 --> 00:04:51,060 cyberspace for illegal monetary gain . 129 00:04:51,840 --> 00:04:54,610 Iran uses cyberspace to coerce its own 130 00:04:54,610 --> 00:04:56,666 population into social and political 131 00:04:56,666 --> 00:04:59,080 compliance and to intimidate and affect 132 00:04:59,090 --> 00:05:02,340 its regional competitors criminals 133 00:05:02,350 --> 00:05:04,572 working independently or in conjunction 134 00:05:04,572 --> 00:05:06,628 with state governments undermine the 135 00:05:06,628 --> 00:05:08,850 effectiveness of the internet as a mode 136 00:05:08,850 --> 00:05:10,961 of information sharing , commerce and 137 00:05:10,961 --> 00:05:13,900 research . These competitors strike at 138 00:05:13,900 --> 00:05:15,567 the very heart of our country 139 00:05:15,567 --> 00:05:17,622 attempting to influence the american 140 00:05:17,622 --> 00:05:19,789 way of life and the foundations of our 141 00:05:19,789 --> 00:05:22,660 democracy . The range of threats at 142 00:05:22,660 --> 00:05:24,882 home and abroad in this situation makes 143 00:05:24,882 --> 00:05:27,040 our interagency partnerships more 144 00:05:27,040 --> 00:05:30,080 essential than ever . Despite these 145 00:05:30,080 --> 00:05:32,250 adversities , we've seen opportunities 146 00:05:32,250 --> 00:05:34,700 as well . The situation in Ukraine has 147 00:05:34,710 --> 00:05:36,821 energized our alliances and increased 148 00:05:36,821 --> 00:05:39,220 the appetite for combined operations 149 00:05:39,230 --> 00:05:41,230 among our international partners in 150 00:05:41,230 --> 00:05:44,190 cyberspace democracies are working 151 00:05:44,190 --> 00:05:46,079 together to defend against covert 152 00:05:46,079 --> 00:05:48,134 foreign influence on their governing 153 00:05:48,134 --> 00:05:50,357 systems and societies while maintaining 154 00:05:50,357 --> 00:05:52,468 fundamental freedoms and ensuring the 155 00:05:52,468 --> 00:05:54,670 privacy of their citizens . We must 156 00:05:54,670 --> 00:05:56,781 continue to find ways to defeat those 157 00:05:56,781 --> 00:05:58,837 threats and at the same time protect 158 00:05:58,837 --> 00:06:00,890 our values . In conjunction with 159 00:06:00,900 --> 00:06:02,990 interagency lawyers , cyber com 160 00:06:02,990 --> 00:06:05,120 attorneys are tackling unprecedented 161 00:06:05,120 --> 00:06:07,009 constitutional issues . While the 162 00:06:07,009 --> 00:06:09,064 United States faces some of the most 163 00:06:09,064 --> 00:06:11,960 serious threats in its history , the 164 00:06:11,960 --> 00:06:14,340 cyberspace domain saw new and unique 165 00:06:14,340 --> 00:06:16,562 threats materialized in the past year . 166 00:06:17,340 --> 00:06:19,451 No sooner had we completed operations 167 00:06:19,451 --> 00:06:21,562 to defend the 2020 federal election , 168 00:06:21,570 --> 00:06:23,514 we face the solar winds breach and 169 00:06:23,514 --> 00:06:25,681 vulnerabilities in commercial products 170 00:06:25,681 --> 00:06:28,690 affecting thousands of systems . The 171 00:06:28,690 --> 00:06:30,579 effects across public and private 172 00:06:30,579 --> 00:06:32,412 sectors brought forth a whole of 173 00:06:32,412 --> 00:06:34,870 government response . Cyber com 174 00:06:34,870 --> 00:06:36,981 supported the law enforcement efforts 175 00:06:36,981 --> 00:06:39,148 of the FBI and the domestic mission of 176 00:06:39,148 --> 00:06:41,490 DHS's cybersecurity and infrastructure , 177 00:06:41,490 --> 00:06:44,910 security agency , incidents of 178 00:06:44,910 --> 00:06:46,854 ransomware increased in number and 179 00:06:46,854 --> 00:06:49,180 attention in 2021 . Perhaps foremost 180 00:06:49,180 --> 00:06:51,124 among them . The colonial pipeline 181 00:06:51,124 --> 00:06:54,150 shutdown malicious cyber actors appear 182 00:06:54,150 --> 00:06:56,380 to be in pursuit of profit . They were 183 00:06:56,380 --> 00:06:58,330 a little more than thieves . Their 184 00:06:58,330 --> 00:07:00,274 actions left millions of americans 185 00:07:00,274 --> 00:07:02,500 without access to fuel . The radiating 186 00:07:02,500 --> 00:07:04,667 effects appeared more like a strategic 187 00:07:04,667 --> 00:07:07,610 attack than a mere theft . This event 188 00:07:07,620 --> 00:07:09,787 highlights the convergence of national 189 00:07:09,787 --> 00:07:11,898 security threats in criminal activity 190 00:07:11,898 --> 00:07:14,720 in cyberspace . Because malicious cyber 191 00:07:14,720 --> 00:07:16,831 actors operate in overlapping mission 192 00:07:16,831 --> 00:07:19,050 areas . Federal organizations must be 193 00:07:19,050 --> 00:07:21,272 fully empowered to use their respective 194 00:07:21,272 --> 00:07:23,910 capabilities and authorities and must 195 00:07:23,910 --> 00:07:25,688 collaborate to ensure effective 196 00:07:25,688 --> 00:07:29,220 responses . Some malicious actors are 197 00:07:29,220 --> 00:07:30,776 working as proxies of state 198 00:07:30,776 --> 00:07:32,980 institutions who seek to reshape 199 00:07:32,990 --> 00:07:35,470 international systems , others are 200 00:07:35,470 --> 00:07:38,360 seeking profit . Some are doing both . 201 00:07:39,140 --> 00:07:41,084 The complexity of working in these 202 00:07:41,084 --> 00:07:42,918 overlapping areas became readily 203 00:07:42,918 --> 00:07:46,490 apparent in 2021 , we must deny these 204 00:07:46,490 --> 00:07:48,657 actors the benefit of operating in the 205 00:07:48,657 --> 00:07:50,601 so called gray zone where they are 206 00:07:50,601 --> 00:07:52,823 mistaken to believe that the law cannot 207 00:07:52,823 --> 00:07:55,500 reach them on the defensive end . Our 208 00:07:55,500 --> 00:07:57,590 hunt forward operations increased in 209 00:07:57,590 --> 00:07:59,590 depth and number in the past year . 210 00:07:59,940 --> 00:08:02,051 Working with our foreign partners and 211 00:08:02,051 --> 00:08:04,051 allies on their network systems and 212 00:08:04,051 --> 00:08:05,940 equipment , we detect adversaries 213 00:08:05,940 --> 00:08:07,996 activities and ensure that malicious 214 00:08:07,996 --> 00:08:09,829 cyber actors cannot use the same 215 00:08:09,829 --> 00:08:11,829 tactics , techniques and procedures 216 00:08:11,829 --> 00:08:14,390 against the networks we defend as we 217 00:08:14,390 --> 00:08:16,057 conduct these operations . We 218 00:08:16,057 --> 00:08:18,168 strengthen our relationships with our 219 00:08:18,168 --> 00:08:20,168 partners and allies and gain mutual 220 00:08:20,168 --> 00:08:22,057 understanding of capabilities and 221 00:08:22,057 --> 00:08:24,057 threats . In addition to addressing 222 00:08:24,057 --> 00:08:26,279 immediate cyber threats , were creating 223 00:08:26,279 --> 00:08:27,723 the foundation for future 224 00:08:27,723 --> 00:08:29,890 interoperability with these partners . 225 00:08:30,240 --> 00:08:32,407 Partnership with the private sector is 226 00:08:32,407 --> 00:08:34,629 more critical than ever because private 227 00:08:34,629 --> 00:08:36,684 organizations see cyberspace threats 228 00:08:36,684 --> 00:08:38,407 from a different and important 229 00:08:38,407 --> 00:08:40,850 perspective , our adversaries make no 230 00:08:40,850 --> 00:08:42,794 distinction between government and 231 00:08:42,794 --> 00:08:44,961 private networks when seeking to steal 232 00:08:44,961 --> 00:08:47,370 farmer disable their targets . In this 233 00:08:47,370 --> 00:08:49,481 year's National Defense authorization 234 00:08:49,481 --> 00:08:51,703 Act , Congress authorized cyber command 235 00:08:51,703 --> 00:08:53,537 to establish processes to engage 236 00:08:53,620 --> 00:08:55,731 private sector information technology 237 00:08:55,731 --> 00:08:58,020 and cybersecurity entities to inform 238 00:08:58,020 --> 00:09:00,242 and support the defense against foreign 239 00:09:00,242 --> 00:09:02,740 malicious cyber actors , participation 240 00:09:02,740 --> 00:09:04,684 in this voluntary process empowers 241 00:09:04,684 --> 00:09:06,907 those in the public and private sectors 242 00:09:06,907 --> 00:09:09,018 that are best able to protect America 243 00:09:09,018 --> 00:09:11,184 to leverage each other's cybersecurity 244 00:09:11,184 --> 00:09:13,960 expertise . Much of this cooperation 245 00:09:14,090 --> 00:09:16,146 will take place through the National 246 00:09:16,146 --> 00:09:17,979 Security Agency's cyber Security 247 00:09:17,979 --> 00:09:19,701 collaboration center . Another 248 00:09:19,701 --> 00:09:21,368 demonstration of the critical 249 00:09:21,368 --> 00:09:23,368 partnership between the command and 250 00:09:23,368 --> 00:09:25,146 agency . We created this office 251 00:09:25,146 --> 00:09:27,312 specifically to work with industry and 252 00:09:27,312 --> 00:09:29,534 through it we communicate with partners 253 00:09:29,534 --> 00:09:31,534 like the defense industrial base to 254 00:09:31,534 --> 00:09:33,757 share the information necessary to make 255 00:09:33,757 --> 00:09:36,460 the nation safe . In conjunction with 256 00:09:36,460 --> 00:09:39,290 the FBI DHS , cybersecurity and 257 00:09:39,290 --> 00:09:41,510 Infrastructure , Security agency and 258 00:09:41,520 --> 00:09:43,710 other inter agency partners . We share 259 00:09:43,710 --> 00:09:45,988 information on threats to the homeland . 260 00:09:46,640 --> 00:09:48,640 The private sector played a pivotal 261 00:09:48,640 --> 00:09:50,807 role in many of the great successes we 262 00:09:50,807 --> 00:09:53,030 have had in the past year . Our private 263 00:09:53,030 --> 00:09:54,919 sector partners provided critical 264 00:09:54,919 --> 00:09:56,919 information that enabled operations 265 00:09:56,919 --> 00:09:59,086 against our most dangerous and capable 266 00:09:59,086 --> 00:10:01,970 adversaries . We are also looking to 267 00:10:01,970 --> 00:10:03,914 increase our partnerships with the 268 00:10:03,914 --> 00:10:06,081 academic world . Recently we announced 269 00:10:06,081 --> 00:10:07,970 the establishment of our academic 270 00:10:07,970 --> 00:10:10,081 engagement network which now consists 271 00:10:10,081 --> 00:10:13,060 of 92 higher level institutions from 40 272 00:10:13,060 --> 00:10:15,520 states . It includes 14 community 273 00:10:15,520 --> 00:10:17,410 colleges , 10 minority serving 274 00:10:17,410 --> 00:10:19,760 institutions for military service 275 00:10:19,760 --> 00:10:21,950 academies and four professional level 276 00:10:21,950 --> 00:10:24,820 military colleges . This initiative is 277 00:10:24,820 --> 00:10:27,330 focused on four lines of effort the 278 00:10:27,330 --> 00:10:29,600 future workforce , applied cyber 279 00:10:29,600 --> 00:10:32,490 research , applied analytics and 280 00:10:32,490 --> 00:10:35,260 strategic issues . Our goal is to meet 281 00:10:35,260 --> 00:10:37,540 cyberspace educational requirements and 282 00:10:37,540 --> 00:10:39,700 develop professionals who can handle 283 00:10:39,710 --> 00:10:42,660 any cyberspace challenge . We look 284 00:10:42,660 --> 00:10:44,771 forward to expanding this network and 285 00:10:44,771 --> 00:10:46,604 will be taking the next round of 286 00:10:46,604 --> 00:10:49,280 partner applications starting on July 1 287 00:10:49,280 --> 00:10:53,010 2022 over the past decade . Cyber 288 00:10:53,010 --> 00:10:55,040 command has hosted more than 130 289 00:10:55,050 --> 00:10:56,939 interns from the U . S . Military 290 00:10:56,939 --> 00:10:58,883 service academies and universities 291 00:10:59,730 --> 00:11:02,090 today . You'll meet one of them , Miss 292 00:11:02,090 --> 00:11:04,700 Marie Dugas , an intern from our staff 293 00:11:04,710 --> 00:11:06,960 judge advocate office who will moderate 294 00:11:07,100 --> 00:11:09,044 our , meet the cyber press panel . 295 00:11:09,640 --> 00:11:11,850 Marie's internship is just one example 296 00:11:11,850 --> 00:11:13,517 of the commands commitment to 297 00:11:13,517 --> 00:11:15,628 innovative partnerships with academia 298 00:11:15,628 --> 00:11:17,961 to grow . Tomorrow's cyberspace leaders . 299 00:11:18,040 --> 00:11:19,873 Last year at this conference , I 300 00:11:19,873 --> 00:11:22,040 discussed the expectations we have for 301 00:11:22,040 --> 00:11:24,096 attorneys who hope to work with us . 302 00:11:24,096 --> 00:11:26,020 Cyber command While I know many 303 00:11:26,020 --> 00:11:27,964 watching today are not attorneys , 304 00:11:27,964 --> 00:11:30,660 everyone is a potential client . I want 305 00:11:30,660 --> 00:11:32,882 to discuss those expectations again and 306 00:11:32,882 --> 00:11:34,882 expand on them with another year of 307 00:11:34,882 --> 00:11:37,940 legal experience behind us . Cyberspace 308 00:11:37,940 --> 00:11:40,162 touches almost every legal discipline , 309 00:11:40,162 --> 00:11:41,940 privacy , information sharing , 310 00:11:41,940 --> 00:11:43,884 acquisition , constitutional law , 311 00:11:43,884 --> 00:11:46,051 criminal law , copyright and a host of 312 00:11:46,051 --> 00:11:48,560 other areas . Cyber com attorneys are 313 00:11:48,560 --> 00:11:50,782 not just experts in the operational law 314 00:11:50,782 --> 00:11:53,004 and intelligence frameworks that govern 315 00:11:53,004 --> 00:11:55,227 all combatant commands . They also work 316 00:11:55,227 --> 00:11:57,210 within a diverse and complex legal 317 00:11:57,210 --> 00:11:59,154 practice that goes well beyond the 318 00:11:59,154 --> 00:12:02,480 ordinary . Our attorneys are expected 319 00:12:02,480 --> 00:12:04,702 to provide timely legal perspectives on 320 00:12:04,702 --> 00:12:06,813 complex , contractual and operational 321 00:12:06,813 --> 00:12:09,060 issues that shaped the commands courses 322 00:12:09,060 --> 00:12:12,160 of action . They must take into account 323 00:12:12,410 --> 00:12:14,210 a wide range of technological , 324 00:12:14,220 --> 00:12:16,290 military and legal issues that are 325 00:12:16,290 --> 00:12:19,140 often groundbreaking to give one 326 00:12:19,140 --> 00:12:21,720 example , contract law plays a critical 327 00:12:21,720 --> 00:12:24,150 role in the cyber mission space before 328 00:12:24,150 --> 00:12:26,206 a crisis . Our acquisition attorneys 329 00:12:26,206 --> 00:12:28,317 must visualize the circumstances that 330 00:12:28,317 --> 00:12:30,430 may arise during a contract lifecycle 331 00:12:30,430 --> 00:12:32,620 and address contingencies up front so 332 00:12:32,620 --> 00:12:34,842 they do not need to be solved when time 333 00:12:34,842 --> 00:12:37,190 is short and action is imminent . It 334 00:12:37,190 --> 00:12:39,412 requires imagination and forethought to 335 00:12:39,412 --> 00:12:41,357 create contractual frameworks that 336 00:12:41,357 --> 00:12:43,357 address the many circumstances that 337 00:12:43,357 --> 00:12:46,270 cyberspace may present . These issues 338 00:12:46,270 --> 00:12:48,170 are complex and interesting , and 339 00:12:48,170 --> 00:12:49,948 addressing them is essential to 340 00:12:49,948 --> 00:12:51,760 national security . You have an 341 00:12:51,760 --> 00:12:53,704 exciting day ahead of you . I hope 342 00:12:53,704 --> 00:12:55,371 you'll take advantage of this 343 00:12:55,371 --> 00:12:57,482 opportunity to learn more about cyber 344 00:12:57,482 --> 00:12:59,371 command and explore ways to build 345 00:12:59,371 --> 00:13:01,538 stronger partnerships . My best to all 346 00:13:01,538 --> 00:13:03,482 of you and I hope we will see each 347 00:13:03,482 --> 00:13:05,760 other in person this time next year .